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The constitutional freedoms of religion and expression have
been persistently urged as defenses to charges for violation of
the drug laws. These efforts to expand the symbolic dimen-
sion of first amendment protection have been for the most part
unsuccessful. The authors question the failure to recognize
the defenses forwarded in these cases. To attempt a resolution
of the issue, they consider the principles of liberty and pro-
cedural due process as they apply to the police power and
individual rights under the Constitution. Focusing principally
on the freedom of expression and its underlying rationale, they
propose an analysis which logically includes drug use within
the scope of the first amendment.
Drugs, narcotics and addictive substances are common topics of
discussion. Positions concerning their use, however, are polarized.
Devotees of psychedelic drugs, for example, claim to find in their use
everything from self-knowledge to the essential roots of a new idealistic
society. Opponents of drug use for pleasurable personal experience
claim that it accelerates addiction, impels users into crime to maintain
their habit and induces eventual self-destruction. This debate rages
in the face of inadequate information about the personal effects of
various drugs. For one thing, it is frequently difficult to establish
whether a drug is in fact addictive or harmful; drug users claim that
alcohol itself is harmful, dependence inducing and reality distorting.
Secondly, the difference between addiction and habit is ill-defined;'
many people appear dependent on caffeine, nicotine and aspirin.
Finally, the personal effects of drug use vary-different people report
different experiences; nor are medical pronouncements much of a
guide.
* This article was conceived and organized by Jonathan Weiss who also did
the majority of the writing and research. The section on privacy and its relation
to the police power is primarily Stephen Wizner's product. Both authors have
discussed and criticized each other's work and together developed the affirmative
thesis we present here.
** Managing Attorney, Mobilization for Youth, Inc., New York City; BA., LL.B.,
Yale University.
***Managing Attorney, Mobilization for Youth, Inc., New York City; B.A.
Dartmouth College; JD., University of Chicago.
I M. OSTow, DRUGS 3N PsYcHoANALYsis AxD PsYcHoTRAPY (1962); see People v.
Kimberly, 189 Cal. App. 2d 300, 11 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961).
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The law has nonetheless entered this thicket of emotional discussion
and personal commitment with proscriptions and pronouncements.
Distinguishing precisely between "medical drugs" and "addictive
drugs," it permits the sale of the former while imposing criminal
penalties on sale of the latter.2 Further, in the case of narcotic and
psychedelic drugs, the law imposes additional penalties for mere
possession, perhaps regardless of a doctor's prescription.3 The logical
and factual basis of such classification is not always apparent.4 For
our purpose, however, this article need not inquire into the rationale
of current drug legislation which is often factually very suspicious. It
assumes arguendo that some drugs may be addictive, may cause ad-
verse personality changes and may be factors in users' decisions to
commit crimes. At the same time, we accept as honestly presented
the claim of some that drugs provide progress to a new way of life.
Where necessary, we indicate when disputed facts are relevant and to
what degree they affect the legal issues raised by current drug laws,
but the primary focus is on the roots of the controversy and claims of
the contestants.
By drugs we mean any substance not normally considered food
which, upon entering the blood stream, effects chemical change. We
will not use the word as defined by druggists or lawyers, but instead
in the broadest form possible. This article assesses major legal issues
generated by drug laws and their enforcement. First, assuming that
the current "narcotic" drug laws are constitutionally valid, can de-
fenses to prosecutions for possession and use, as opposed to sale, be
framed around the first amendment guarantees of freedom of religion
and expression? Second, do current laws punishing possession and
use violate the constitutional rights to privacy and to be left alone?
Third, to what degree can taking drugs be considered an act defined
as criminal?
These issues lead us to consider the relation of the self to society and,
derivatively, the stake society has in the self, abnormal behavior,
mental illness and self-destruction. Through this approach we attempt
to locate neutral constitutional and legal principles which establish a
range of rights to drug use. To that task we now turn.
2 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11501, 11531, 11532 (West 1964).
3 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11500, 11530 (West 1964).
4 Marijuana, for example, is probably not addictive. See Drewy, Some Psychia-
tric Aspects of Marijuana Intoxication, 10 PsYcHIATmST Q. 232-42 (1936); Mayor's
Committee on Marijuana, The Marijuana Problem in New York (1944). However,
the importation of marijuana is strictly controlled by the federal government. See
NAmcOTIc DRUGS IMPoRT & ExPORT AcT, 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1961); 26 U.S.C. §
4744(a) (2) (1967). See generally Symposium - Drugs and the Law, 56 CALiF.
L. REv. 1 (1968); Symposium - Marihuana and the Law, 3 SuFF. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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I. FREEDom oF RELIGION
One defense to prosecution for drug use has been that certain drugs,
particularly peyote and other psychedelics, are essential to the user's
religious life and therefore protected by the first amendment guarantee
of free exercise of religion. This defense depends in part on the claim
that psychedelic drugs foster mystical religious experiences.
The religious defense has failed in analogous areas. Thus, a law
prohibiting polygamy was upheld despite the claim that polygamy was
a Morman religious duty.5 States have particularly proscribed the
use of snakes in religious activities. 6  Fortune telling, defended on
religious grounds, has nevertheless been prosecuted.7 People have
been prohibited from beating drums in the streets even for religious
purposes." A preacher was prohibited from advertising the perform-
ance of marriage ceremonies in order to make money.' Finally, in
1926, a religious defense to a prosecution for the use of peyote failed.10
These cases seem to indicate that an act, otherwise unlawful, which
endangers or inconveniences the public,"x may not be exclusively
defended against by invoking the label "religion."
5 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). More sanctions were imposed
such as disenfranchisement, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), and exclusion
from office, Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). One could inquire whether
such rules so clearly directed against Mormons are suspect under Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942); State v.
Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949). See also Morman Church v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 50 (1890). For a saga of snake bites and murder at a religious
meeting, see Amburgey v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 421, 153 S.W.2d 918 (1941).
7 See State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912). But see Dolan v. Hurley,
283 F. 695 (D. Mass. 1922), where the court upheld a defense to a fraud prosecution
for selling "lucky" stones on the ground that
there is nothing immoral in a belief that gems or amulets affect the
wearer's fortunes. It is an old and respectable superstition. Indeed, it
is by no means sure that the confidence inspired by a belief in such ob-
jects may not be of real value. Some room must be left for the play of
individual fancy." Id. at 696.
8 City of Wilkes-Barre v. Garabed, 11 Pa. Super. 355 (1899).
9 Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69 A.2d 456 (1949), following State v. Clay, 182
Md. 639, 35 A.2d 821 (1944). One could query the test: Such advertising was "not
compatible with the ministerial calling and not practiced by any respectable
minister." 193 Md. at 497, 69 A.2d at 459.
10 State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926). One justification for
the holding was that the state "may inhibit acts or practices which tend toward
the subversion of the civil government." Id. at 240, 243 P. 1073.
31 Although moral judgments and concern for moral corruption by polygamy
and fortune-telling are certainly involved, this aspect would seem constitutionally
infirm. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
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Two other groups of related cases illuminate the borderlands of the
religious defense: (1) those compelling parents to act against their
religious beliefs for the presumed benefit of their children, and (2)
those forcing medical treatment on adults contrary to their religious
convictions. Typical of the first group are criminal prosecutions for
child neglect against parents who refuse to provide medical services
for their children.12
The most difficult case in the first group is Prince v. Massachusetts,13
which upheld a parent's conviction for violating the Massachusetts
child labor laws by participating in her young niece's distribution of
Watchtower on the streets. The majority of the Supreme Court felt
bound by the state's characterization of the act as a "sale" and there-
fore unlawful under the state's child labor laws. Mrs. Prince defended
on the ground that the Massachusetts law violated her child's right to
freedom of religion, that is, her right "to preach the gospel . . .by
public distribution of 'Watchtower' . . . in conformity with the
scripture: 'A little child shall lead them.' ",14 The court, however,
reasoned that the state's interest in protecting its children from "the
crippling effects of child employment" justified the impingement upon
a claimed religious freedom.15 Justice Murphy dissented on the ground
that the first amendment guarantee of religious freedom compelled the
Court to reject the state's characterization of the act as a sale.16 He
argued that the Jehovah Witness designation of the act as essentially
religious, and therefore protected, must prevail since there was no
evidence of a legitimate state interest in proscribing the act. More-
over, since the Constitution commands that religious teaching never be
considered harmful, the Jehovah Witness characterization must be
accepted. Justice Jackson, also in dissent,27 reaffirmed his position
that, although public activities may be regulated neutrally, acts
occasioned by religious principles which do not harm others are
protected and may not be prohibited.
One crucial problem in Prince is characterizing the child's act. The
state must decide whether to characterize it as a simple "sale" in vio-
12 Most of the cases involve a sickness and steadfast refusal to see a doctor.
Courts have normally handled the question by treating it as a crime. The lead-
ing case is People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903). See also Regina
v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116
P. 345 (1911). On the other hand, while acknowledging that religion is no defense
to a crime of neglect, a court has reversed on a finding of no gross dereliction.
Graig v. Maryland, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
13 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
14Id. at 164.
'15 Id. at 168.
16 Id. at 17L
17 Id. at 176.
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lation of the child labor laws, or to characterize it in light of the act's
religious aspects. Murphy maintains that we must accept its religious
nature to maximize freedom; Jackson argues that a public act which
harms no one can be treated as symbolically protected, but not crim-
inally prohibited. Notwithstanding the arguments of Justices Murphy
and Jackson, the majority position seems sounder to the extent that
the regulated conduct is public and has tangible public consequences,
The state had a legitimate stake in preserving its children from harm
and could prohibit child labor as a reasonable regulation toward that
end. To consider activity involving money and materials as labor
is possible; to characterize it as purely symbolic is mistaken. Of
course, if the law were just a cloak for persecution, it would be
unconstitutional in any event.1 9 But as a characterization of concrete
acts whose tangible aspects could be considered harmful, it is pro-
scribable.
The Prince case is based on narrow grounds. If Rutledge and col-
leagues had been convinced that children had the same rights as
adults and/or that Massachusetts could not interpret a public act
or was using such a definition as a cloak to attack religious principles
and perspectives, the statute would have been ruled unconstitutional.
At the same time, the Justices were not directly countenancing a
religious defense. Rather, they were exploring what type of pro-
scriptions a state may formulate without infringing constitutional free-
doms. In short, the leading case and conceptually related decisions
indicate a judicial reluctance to proscribe or prescribe the activities
of children counter to the parents' religious principles, unless such
intervention will prevent a child from being physically harmed by
parental acts or omissions. This formulation offers no definite guide-
lines for a religious defense to prosecution for drug use since the
reluctance recognizes on the one hand parental rights and the sanc-
tity of the family, while the enactment of proscriptions and their
application derives in part from the special state concern for infants.
The second class of cases involves the use of coercive action against
adults, such as compulsory vaccination 2° and mandatory chemical
18 See People v. Ewer, 141 N.Y. 129, 36 N.E. 4 (1894), upholding a law prevent-
ing children from theatrical performances even though the parents' rights were
affected. Somehow, when aesthetic preferences rather than religious ones are at
stake, the decision seems easier, although both are protected by the first amend-
ment. See also Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
19 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See generally Weiss, Privilege
Posture, and Protection, "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 608-09 (1964).
20Compare Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) with Kolbeck v.
Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d 889 (1964). Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 (1897). See also In re Vremiestor, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904)
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treatment of drinking water.21 Denying the religious defense in
these cases is fairly justified on grounds of protecting the health of
others. Hence, the state's right and interest in the isolated individual's
integrity is not directly at stake. More perplexing, however, are
those cases involving compulsory blood transfusions. The opinions
in these cases differ both within and among jurisdictions and tend
to avoid the question of whether the state can compel transfusions
for a person's own good against his religious convictions. Appar-
ently, the state can compel a pregnant mother to accept a transfu-
sion to save her child,22 and may assume that absence of consent
is not refusal.23 Further, courts have compelled transfusions where
the doctor's conscience and the threat of criminal liability for failure
to administer the transfusion were involved.24  On the other hand,
courts have respected patients' refusals of blood transfusions where
there is medical disagreement as to their necessity.25 The spectacle
of compulsion leads some courts to accept the patient's refusal of
blood and even to acknowledge religious "rights" to refuse.26 These
cases, read together, unfortunately offer no clear guidelines for the
use, context or extent of religious defenses in drug use cases.
A. The Religious Defense in Prosecution for Drug Use
Recently the courts have considered the religious defense to prose-
cutions for drug use. In People v. Woody2" a group of Navajo Indians
21 See Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 76 Ohio Op. 36, 121 N.E.2d 311 (1954); Dowell
v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash. 2d
616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954).22 Raleigh Fithin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Andersen, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
23 The leading case is Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col,
Inc. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Substantially in accord are Powell v. Colum-
bian Presbyterian Medical Center, 49 lMisc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct.
1965) and United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1965). See generally
Note, 33 FORD. L. REv. 513 (1965); Note, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 190 (1965).
2 4 See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown Col., Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S. 2d 666
(Sup. Ct. 1964). But see Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup.
Ct. 1962). See generally Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling
Patients, 36 FoRD. L. Rnv. 695 (1968).
2 5 See United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D.D.C. 1965).
2 0 See In re Brooks, 32 Ml1. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
27 61 CaL 2d 716, 394 P. 2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). Compare id., with In re
Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P. 2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964) (solitary peyote users),
where the court said that the defendant had "not proved ... an honest and bona
fide" belief and remanded for a trial on that issue. Investigation into sincerity
clearly is impossible under the Constitution. See United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Clancy & Weiss, The Conscien-
tious Objector Exemption: Problems in Conceptual Clarity and Constitutional
Considerations, 17 MAwNE L. REv. 143, 153-54 (1965); Weiss, supra note 19 at
599-601.
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appealed a conviction for possession of peyote in violation of a Cali-
fornia statute. The court held that since the defendants used peyote
in a bona fide pursuit of a religious faith, and since the practice does
not frustrate a compelling interest of the state, application of the
statute improperly defeated the immunity of the first amendment.
28
It rested its analysis on two Supreme Court decisions, Sherbert v.
Verner29 and In re Jennison.3 0 Sherbert held that a state unemploy-
ment compensation board must pay benefits to a Seventh-Day Adven-
tist who refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath, even though she
was arguably not available for Saturday employment. (What the
result would have been had her religion designated every day or
week-days as a Sabbath is not clear.) The rationale was that the
withholding of compensation benefits penalized petitioner for exer-
cising her religion. The Court in Jennison reversed the Minnesota
Supreme Court which had denied the invocation of the biblical in-
junction "judge not lest ye be judged" to excuse petitioner from jury
duty. 1 In neither case did the Court find a compelling state interest
to justify the substantial infringement on petitioners' first amend-
ment rights.
Woody extracted the principle from these cases that a religious
practice or ritual must be first examined to determine whether it
presents a danger to the society which the state has a compelling
interest in preventing. Utilizing this principle, the court performed
a balancing test, weighing the importance of the religious freedom
against the state's compelling interest, and concluded:
Since the use of peyote incorporates the essence of the religious expres-
sion, [its] weight is heavy. Yet the use of peyote presents only slight
danger to the state and to the enforcement of its laws; [this] weight is
relatively light. The scale tips in favor of the constitutional protection. 32
The opinion in Woody makes the Warren report appear in contrast
as a model of coherence, reasoning and persuasiveness. If Sherbert
and Jennison present the definite formulation of the law, which they
do not, they still do not justify the approach taken in Woody. In
Sherbert and Jennison there was no weighing of social harm against
religious importance. Firstly, both involved a refusal based on a
precept, a refusal that had no physical or public consequences, and
both related to duties owed the government. In Woody members
28 61 Cal. 2d at 727, 394 P2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
29 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
80265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963), rev'd per curiam and remanded, 375 U.S.
14 (1963).
Sl Id; see Weiss, supra note 19 at 620-21.
82 People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77
(1964).
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of a group insisted that a ritual involving many people in physical
acts with concretely measurable consequences can be done by those
who claim it is religious. Second, just as the analogy is not there,
neither is the claimed principle of harm versus religious importance.
The Sherbert Court rests its decision on penalization of the past
exercise of a claimed religious freedom,33 and does not measure the
Sabbath's religious importance against labor market needs. Further,
in Woody, members of a group insisted that they had a religious
right to engage in a ritual involving many people in illegal physical
acts with concretely measurable consequences, a situation present in
neither Sherbert nor Jennison.
The balancing test formulated in Woody cannot be administered
by the courts. To do so, a court must independently evaluate both
the merits of the religious act and the degree of its perceived danger.
Now is not the time to engage in a dissertation about the separation
of powers, but decisions about harm, degrees and competing values
should be in the legislative realm. The impracticality of a balancing
test reflects its factual and social rather than legal nature. Perhaps
most important in this context is the point that to examine a religion
to determine the importance of a particular ritual is to engage in a
dissection and investigation of religion which is forbidden under the
Constitution.34 The dangers of such an inquiry are illustrated by
People v. Mitchel 35 decided by a lower court in California two years
after Woody. The court upheld Mitchell's conviction for possessing
and using marijuana upon a finding that the courtroom discussion of
the Bible and Hindu practices was an expression of "personal phil-
osophy" rather than religious practice.3 6 At the minimum, Mitchell
limits the application of Woody to religious groups and rituals, a lim-
itation seemingly contrary to the notion that the first amendment
was incorporated not to safeguard institutions, but to protect and in-
crease individual freedom, choice and action.
In particular, assessing the amount of damage which may result
to society from an unlawful act is not a proper judicial function.
33 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1962). See Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.
1967), where the court determined that reliance on Sherbert was misplaced since
marijuana laws are concerned with "protection of society" while the Sherbert
Court was concerned with protecting the individual.
34United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) was cited in Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th Cir. 1967), to prevent inquiry into the "truth or ver-
ity of appellant's religious beliefs." For an extended discussion of this point, see
Weiss, supra note 19 at 604-09. For the implications of this position and the re-
sulting argument that a religious exemption from military service is unworkable,
see Clancy & Weiss, supra note 27 at 152-58.
35 244 Cal. App. 2d 177, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1966).
36 244 Cal. App. 2d at 182, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
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Courts are not free to say that acts the legislature has determined
to be dangerous are not in fact dangerous. The courts are not de-
signed, and do not function, to ascertain and weigh facts of "social"
harm, particularly those of degree. Legislative concepts of danger
may differ and it is those concepts which predicate enactments.
37
Extracting a nonexistent balancing test from such situations infringes
religious freedom and legislative prerogatives.38
Woody and Mitchell do not provide much authority for a reli-
gious defense of drug use. Rather, viewed together, they illustrate
the difficulties of implementing a balancing test which requires the
judiciary to inquire into the merits of religions to assess individual
belief and its importance on a scale balanced against conjectural
harm. Different courts have different ideas concerning what is "per-
sonal philosophy" and what is "religious activity." One individual's
religious practices and convictions may be completely private; an-
other's public posturing may have no individual religious basis.3 9
Such formulations tend to favor religious groups over individuals,
orthodox beliefs over strange ones and present religions over past
ones. Hence, they inhibit the growth of new, minority religions
while favoring and encouraging old, established ones. This leads
to protection of strongly structured groups rather than strong feel-
ing individuals. Further, the distinction between "private" and "pub-
lic" religions is not legitimate under the Constitution.
Moreover, if courts accept the religious defense, they must deter-
mine both the domain of religion generally and the boundaries of
particular religions. Defining the domain of a religion may be in-
tellectually impossible because religions often claim relevance and
control in all dimensions of life.40  To define the boundaries of a
particular religion is to act as a theologian and to do what often
a believer himself cannot.4 ' This point cannot be over-emphasized.
Mitchell more closely resembles Sherbert and Jennison in that it
involved one person following what he believed to be religious prac-
tice. Woody, on the other hand, exempts "members" of a sect
thereby raising issues of equal protection. Both Woody and Mitchell,
however, define religion and its limits and implications in a confusing.
context of "harm".
3 7 See generally E. FREuND, STmAmiAs OF ATIMCAN LEGISLATION (1965), and its
excellent introduction by F.A. Allen.
38It also raises questions of equal protection and due process. See Clancy &
Weiss, supra note 27 at 154-56.
39 See id. at 153-54.
40 See generally Weiss, supra note 19 at 600-05.
41 See Clancy & Weiss, supra note 27 at 155-56; Weiss, supra note 19 at 600-05.
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B. Inherent Problems of the Religious Defense
Beyond the difficulties of these cases lie the problems inherent
in a generalized "religious defense." 42  First, virtually any action
could be defended by utilizing the religious defense, and individuals
could create privileges in the courts not uniformly available to the
public. Second, even if the Constitution and rational administra-
tion of criminal justice could accommodate this defense, courts would
have to develop contexts and criteria of application which do not
presently exist. In what areas would we countenance a religious
defense and why? How would it be applied and by what government
agency? As noted above, references to groups, feelings about rituals
and current religious practices cannot provide such principles. Fi-
nally, as the criticism of the Woody decision indicates, balancing tests
involve the courts in prohibited judgments about religious beliefs
and intrusion into legislative prerogatives.
Given the weak case support for the religious defense, the con-
stitutional and conceptual problems and the current lack of standards,
development of a generalized religious defense seems impossible. The
remainder of this article attempts to define the areas of free expres-
sion and private individual integrity which the state may not infringe
in attempting to regulate drug use.
II. FIMOM OF EXPRMsION
Proponents of drug use, particularly LSD, believe they have dis-
covered a new social doctrine. Not only do they often reject normal
42 See Weiss, supra note 19 at 602-08 for a more complete exposition. But if any
individual can claim religious motives as a defense, then an indiscriminant li-
cense issues and there is no "law." Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir.
1987). This rule would motivate the wrongful recourse to groups and is part of
the proof that the religious defense is unworkable, particularly when inquiry in-
to sincerity is precluded. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)
(human sacrifice); Delk v. Commonwealth, 166 Ky. 39, 178 S.W. 1129 (1915)
(swearing by a minister in church). See the failure of the religious defense to a
prosecution for not carrying draft cards. United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823 (1951); cf. Hamilton v. Regents of Univ.
of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1954) (refusal to join ROTC); United States v. Aarons,
310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962) (free expression defense to violation of Coast Guard
regulation); Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949) aff'd per curiam
340 U.S. 857 (1950); People v. Penn, 16 N.Y2d 581, 208 N.E2d 789, 260 N.Y.S.2d 847
(1965). See notes 34-38 supra. For particular reference to narcotics and grand
juries, see People v. Woodruff, 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). Con-
sider the difficulties, finally, in construing a religious exemption previously defined
by the legislature. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Clancy &
Weiss, supra note 27.
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social values and goals, but many also assert that they are members
of a "love" generation or that they are creating a new way of life.4
3
Many wear buttons and picket to legalize various drugs. Some even
staged a "smoke-in" in Tompkins Park in New York.44  The con-
stitutional question which arises is whether, given the social values
implicitly expressed by use of drugs, and given the fact that social
groups embodying new ideals of social living center around the drugs,
drug use can be constitutionally defended as free expression under
the first amendment. There are three areas of inquiry: (1) What
activities are included in the concept of "expression"? (2) Is drug
use included in the concept of expression? (3) If drug use is ex-
pression, is it therefore protected under the first amendment?
A. The Concept of Protected Expression
Communication by words alone is clearly expression. However,
other means of communication have engendered litigation on the
meaning of "expression": "The First Amendment affords protection
not merely to the voicing of abstract opinions upon public issues.
It also protects implementing conduct which is in the nature of
advocacy. '45 In 1940 the Court, per Justice Murphy, held in Carlson
v. California46 that displaying signs and banners was a form of pro-
tected speech. Earlier, the Court in Stromberg v. California4 7 had
assumed that displaying flags was protected speech, striking down
a statute prohibiting such actions on grounds of vagueness. Peace-
ful picketing has also been held a form of speech by a unanimous
court.48 Arguably, sit-ins have been treated as speech. 9 Performance
of a "topless" dance, for the entertainment of an audience in a com-
4 3 See The Hippies, serialized in the New York Post, Sept. 11, 1967 at 42.
44 New York Post, Aug., 17, 1967, at 3.
45 NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir.
1964) (emphasis added).
46310 U.S. 106 (1940). In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943), a compulsory flag salute was held unconstitutional, thereby recog-
nizing that gestures communicate.
-7 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
-
8 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940). The purity and scope of
this decision have been considerably weakened by such cases as Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941) in which the relation
of acts of violence to picketing justified upholding the injunction against it. Cf.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951). See Weiss, Book Review, 72 YALE L.J. 1665, 1669-70 (1963). In any event.
the picketing cases are another illustration of non-verbal communication.
49 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,
201-02 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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mercial establishment, has also been considered protected expression
within the first amendment." On the other hand, the Supreme Court,
while talking of noise control, has imposed absolute bans on sound
trucks.1' Also, lower courts have rejected the claim that flag desecra-
tion is protected speech 2 and a local court has upheld a prohibition
against hanging materials on clotheslines to protest taxes.52
Recently the Supreme Court handed down a very narrow reading
of protected "symbolic" speech. In United States v. O'Brien,54 re-
viewing two conflicting circuit court opinions, 5 it held that draft
card burning was neither political speech nor symbolic expression.
With great effort, reminiscent of Fleming v. Nestor,56 the Court found
many practical reasons why a prohibition of draft card burning
efficiently aided the Selective Service System. One could therefore
argue that this case was merely a holding on the facts that a regu-
lation justified by actual necessity will not be struck down merely
because it affects methods of action by which people choose to ex-
press themselves.5 7 Historically, it may also be viewed as a result
of political pressure. The dangerous dicta, however, includes a thesis
on how legislative intent to punish speech is irrelevant.5 8  Viewed
in any light, the case is hard authority against the expansion of "sym-
bolic expression" and must be distinguished by an advocate and con-
sidered aberrational from the real rationale of other symbolic expres-
sion cases.
Although no definitive guidelines emerge concerning the protec-
tion of speech which is considered symbolic, yet public activity, the
decisions have involved several common elements: (1) a clear po-
litical issue-statements on labor conditions, party loyalty, segrega-
tion and war; (2) actions clearly related to the political issue either
50 I re Giannini, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal Rptr. 655 (1968).
51 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
52 See People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967);
New York L.J., Sept. 6, 1967, at 1. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) upheld
forbidding a use of flags in advertising recognizing its ideological content. Ad-
vertising is, of course, treated differently from political expression. See note
51 supra.
53 See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 NE.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
54 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
55 See United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966); Smith v. United States,
368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966).
560 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
5 Harlan concurs with a strict statement of this view. But see NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and United States v. Carolene Prods Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), for examples of a different approach. Compare id., with Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
58 But see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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by immediate content-signs--or by dramatizing the specific griev-
ance--draft card burning and sit-ins; and (3) individuals or groups
acting in a specific locale or for a limited time. The inquiry, then,
is whether these elements are present in the use of drugs, and, if
not, whether they are essential to a defense based on free speech.
B. Drug Use as Political Expression
Not all drug use has clear political overtones. A man dependent
on morphine after hospital treatment may have been involuntarily
addicted. On the other hand, cooperative living and the growth of
conventions among users of psychedelic drugs manifest a social vision.
Insofar as drug users utilize drugs as an explicit rejection of society
or societal modes of living, they are engaging in political action.
Recently a three-judge panel enjoined the enforcement of an over-
vague statute proscribing nudity against a nudist colony.59 Although
this ruling was based on vagueness, Judge Darr reached the merits
to hold that the nudists' privacy should be protected and that the
statute violated the freedom of association,60 and the rights to privacy
and equal protection of the law.6' One might argue that the impulse
beneath the vagueness ruling and the concern for the freedom of
association was a recognition that these people were living according
to their social ideals. Similarly, communal use of drugs, because
it embodies particular social values, could be viewed as political
expression.
59 Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 855 (E!D. Tenn. 1966).
60252 F. Supp. at 848-49 (concurring opinion). See also Fenster v. Leary
20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967) discussed infra at note 95.
One might worry about an extension of the argument in the text to the proposi-
tion that anti-social behavior is necessarily protected political speech. What
about thieves? Consider the movie Thief of Paris (1967) for an example of
thievery as expression. See also Lynden, The Last Holdouts, AmTANnc MomLY,
Aug. 1967, at 42-43. This issue is considered implicitly in the text accompanying
notes 101-107 infra. See Justice Jackson's discussion in West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) on the right to differ on things "that
touch the heart of the existing order" and make gestures in regard to them. In
thievery, particular acts are prohibited that may manifest the thief's rejection of
the social order. In nudity and drug sessions the style of life is at stake. Of
course, alleged thieves like all others may gather socially. See United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
61252 F. Supp. at 850. Darr then added a humorous addendum attacking nudists.
Id. Also, the decision of a California lower court that nudist camps are protected
by the first amendment was recently upheld on narrow grounds. People v. Lang,
No. 8187 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Dec. 4, 1968).
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In the case of noncommunal use of drugs, 2 the political aspect is
harder to perceive and define. It can be argued, however, that be-
cause use of illegal drugs so unequivocally sets one against public
morality and defines a different way of life, a clear rejection of so-
ciety and its values, it could very well be treated as political. 3
Two famous cases have dealt with individual acts as relevant to
the good moral character which aliens must maintain for the five
years preceding naturalization. On Repouille v. United States," Judge
Learned Hand held for the majority of two that an alien who com-
mitted an act of euthanasia during this five-year period failed to meet
the "good moral character" requirement since most people considered
mercy killing to be immoral.65 In Schmidt v. United States, 66 Judge
Learned Hand, in dealing with a man who with "unnecessary frank-
ness"67 admitted occasional acts of fornication, decided that he still
possessed the requisite good moral character. Both men, of course,
had violated laws. If they had done so to protest or change the
laws, their acts would have appeared to be political in nature . 6  In
absence of an express motive, however, can we conclude that their
actions were political? We can say at least that their acts had
political-moral content, so much so that a single act was sufficient
in one case, and almost in the other, to lead to a conclusion of 'im-
morality' by public standards-an act therefore of political content.
People rarely use drugs in public; such use is a seeming end in
itself. While pickets and draft card burners intend to convey an
idea, drug users rarely intend their acts to convey ideas explicitly.
Yet drug users, like members of nudist colonies, have a style of life
at stake. Both the "digger" and the solitary junkie embody their
concept of life in their acts. Their acts, therefore, if not specifically
oriented to communicating, are nontheless expressive of their view
62Even "solitary users" often use drugs in a social group. Junkies go to
shooting galleries; pot is often social; and many users belong to a little society
composed of individuals with common problems and a common language.
03But note Justice Black's conclusion that "the First Amendment does not pro-
tect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political."
United Mine Workers v. fllinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967).
64 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
65 Judge Frank dissented on the ground that public opinion and ethical leaders
should be consulted before making a decision. Id. at 154.
60 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
67177 F.2d at 450. One could query whether a Judge should suggest that a
man lie on a governmental form. See 18 U.S.C. §1001 (1966).
68 The range of criminal actions normally committed by people in protest or des-
peration that may be morally justifiable and even legally acceptable is discussed
at length in Allen, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 U. C. L. REv. 1
(1967).
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and function for them, perhaps due to a similar psychological
motivation, as would displaying banners and signs.69 We might say
that style of life may be viewed as political expression, just as a mon-
astic life may be viewed as religious devotion.
C. Drug Use as Protected Expression
If drug use can be treated as political expression, is it therefore
exempt from prosecution? The fact that speech is used in an act
does not protect the act: "[I]t has never been deemed an abridge-
ment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced,
or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed."70 This position is even stronger when the act in question
is not so conspicuously purposeful, political expression.71 Clearly
whispers of conspirators are not immune. Radio is regulated for
content,72 and individuals may be prosecuted for fraudulent state-
ments.78 A proscribed act, once labeled political, does not become
less criminal.
But our inquiry does not end here. The above argument rests on
the assumption that taking drugs, even if embodying a social idea
or politically purposeful, is a proscribable act or proscribed aspect of
an area of activity. It may be, however, that drug use is an entirely
political and social act, lacking those tangible nonideological elements
present in the ends and effects of conspiracy, libel, fraud or, arguably,
draft interference. Our inquiry, therefore, is whether taking drugs
has proscribable aspects or belongs in a scheme of activity that pro-
duces effects which are sanctionable. To do this, we must examine
both the act itself and the power of the state.
3I. ThE RIGHT TO BE SELF-DEsmTucTnv
The keystone to this section can be found in Justice Jackson's
account of the activities of infant Jehovah Witnesses: "The freedom
69 Id. See also P. Wmss & J. Wss, RiGHT Aim WRONG, A PnmosomIcAL DALOGUE
BETEwE FATHER AND SON (1967).
70 Giboney v. Empire Storage, 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949), quoted with approval
in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
71See note 63 supra. Clearly, the claim of political vision is often more lit-
erary than actual.
72 Cox, The FCC, The Constitution, and Religious Broadcasting, 34 GEo. WASI
L. REV. 196 (1965) is an excellent attack on the efficacy and constitutionality of
such regulation.
73 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958). See Weiss, supra note 19 at 593-609 on the concep-
tual problems involved.
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asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with
rights asserted by any other individual.... Nor is there any question
in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly."7 4  In
that case, much to the consternation of many locals and local offi-
cials, Jehovah Witness students were upheld in their refusal to
salute a flag while other classmates did so pursuant to a school
regulation. Similarly, much to the consternation of others, drug
users commit acts which may or may not have effects on their minds.
The question is whether the analogy holds-Does taking physical
substances because of their effects on personal attitudes and expe-
riences have the same constitutional nature as taldng or refusing to
take a symbolic position because of its meaning to the individual?
The resolution of this question requires an examination of our criminal
system and other acts analogous to drug use.
The fundamental document in American democracy is the Con-
stitution. Explicitly based on an accord, it establishes governmental
powers and individual rights. Many specific sections deal with crimes.
The fifth amendment states that no one is to be denied "liberty"
without due process of law. The implication of this command is
that all individuals, or at least all adult citizens, have liberty as an
inherent characteristic of their citizenship. Their ability to consent
implicitly or explicitly reject or affirm, and their part in the con-
tinuing pronouncement, "We, the people," rests on the recognition
that all individuals have liberty. So we can say that the Constitution
envisions a society composed of "free" individuals living together.
Yet that freedom can be taken away. The Constitution also en-
visions arrests, trials and imprisonment, and a criminal process which
must be conducted in a manner consistent with guaranteed procedural
safeguards.
Thus, there are two elements to be considered in analyzing the
imposition of criminal sanctions-liberty and procedural safeguards.
Although, in a constitutional context, these elements could be con-
sidered separately, many reasons favor reading them together. First,
because the Constitution is an attempt to generate fundamental prin-
ciples by which government and society can function, its provisions
are better viewed as related parts in a scheme. Second, the history
of constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court evidences a
reading of the document as a unity, and the principles as related.
7 5
74West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943). See
Weiss, sup'a note 19 at 610.
75 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Griswold
v. Conecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Third, liberty and due process are not only conceptually related, but
also related in fact by specific procedural guarantees, such as rea-
sonable bail, 7 thereby indicating that due process reasonableness was
intended to serve as a protection of liberty. Procedural protections
therefore serve the dual functions of guaranteeing optimum continu-
ation of liberty and of preserving liberty during the criminal process.
How can these elements be combined? On any democratic prin-
ciple one man's freedoms and rights are as valuable as another's. We
all start as free individuals, but some may act in such a way as to
affect other people's freedoms and rights. If we say that it is only
justifiable to interfere with a person's freedom when he interferes
with the freedom of others, the elements are neatly combined. What
is needed then is a procedure for resolving these conflicts. The
state serves this function by determining which acts so adversely
affect other people's freedoms that limitations must be imposed on
the freedom of the actor.
As further proof of the reasonableness of this constitutional ground
of criminal law, consider the implications of a system not based on
a recognition of liberty. If the state could proscribe any act and the
state countenance, as it must and does, prosecutorial discretion, sig-
nificant equal protection problems could arise and the whole point
of procedural due process would vanish. An ordinance against breath-
ing, selectively applied, could lead to oppression. If any act can be
proscribed then we have little need for due process protections
since all we need do is proscribe the acts or characteristics 77 of those
we do not like. (There is more than one way to skin a cat).
But most important is the fact that the Constitution has created
specific categories of exempt acts, those that only affect other people's
beliefs not their freedoms. The first amendment establishes freedom
to promulgate ideas. Again, in Justice Jackson's words:
If official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed, what
it shall contain cannot be decided by courts, but must be largely discre-
tionary with the ordaining authority whose power to prescribe would no
doubt include the power to amend.... If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception they
do not now occur to us .... It would seem that involuntary affirmation
76 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
7 Of course, there are other constitutional guarantees such as those against bills
of attainder which, if properly applied, would protect many rights. U. S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 9. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Note, 72 YArE
L.J. 330 (1962). Equal protection is also a powerful tool. See Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds
than silence. 8
In short, compulsion to perform a symbolic act with specific ideologi-
cal content is forbidden. Persons cannot be compelled to affirm a
pledge which has manifestations cognizable only by those who believe
or those who are concerned with the beliefs of others. 79 There exists
not only the range of freedom of expression but also the specific area
of symbolic activity. In this connection, let us note a refusal to partici-
pate in a ritual when others do can be as symbolic a gesture as par-
ticipation itself-an upright person amidst kneeling people; a person
sitting down while others stand in tribute.
The principle we may extract is that the Constitution has defined
a range of criminal acts. That range encompasses acts whose physical
nonideological consequences affect the rights and freedoms of others.
Restraint is justified upon proof that the acts of one have physical
consequence to the detriment of another's freedom:
[T]he power of a state to regulate and control the conduct of a private
individual is confined by those cases where his conduct injuriously affects
others. With his faults or weaknesses which he keeps to himself and
which do not operate to the detriment of others, the state as such has no
concern.80
Such an inchoate principle has been evidenced in analogous situ-
ations. One judge has stated that the state cannot prescribe what
a man shall eat and wear or drink or think.31 On the same rationale,
peyote and LSD are eaten. Another court has stated that cigarette
smoking cannot be made illegal.82
In a different context, courts have disputed utilizing the police
power to force motorcyclists to wear helmets. The dialogue may be
viewed as starting when a New York judge, later reversed, 3 stated
78 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 642, 633 (1943).
Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) on compelling affirmation of belief.
7 0 See Weiss, supra note 19 at 610-11. It is not entirely clear whether the black
letter of the law is that establishing the ritual is forbidden, whether compelling
children to take postures infringes religious and/or free speech rights, or
whether it is the compulsion of affirmation which is the crucial distasteful element.
Id. The objective in that article was to harmonize all facets; here to explore the
theoretical underpinnings.
so Commonwealth v. Smith 163 Ky. 227, 234, 173 S.W. 340, 343 (1915).
3' Eidge v. Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599, 51 So. 246 (1909).
82 Hersberg v. Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60, 133 S.W. 985 (1911).
83 People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Genesee County Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1967), rev'd, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S2d 931 (Genesee County Ct.,
1968). The rationales were the presumption of constitutionality, legislative fact-
finding, harm to others by careening motorcycles and the need for a healthy
citizenry. The decision is not persuasive but, as yet, there is no record of an
appeal.
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that "the police power is understood by this court ... [to] justif[y]
the regulation of the conduct of one person because of the effect of
that conduct upon other persons,"8' 4 arguing that alcohol and narcotics
are proscribable because they produce anti-social behavior, but that
to force wearing of helmets is unconstitutional. This pronounce-
ment was preceded by another decision that held the prohibition
unconstitutional because it was too indefinite to meet criminal legis-
lative standards, thereby indicating that the legislature really had
no place in prescribing how people dressed.8 5
Then came the answering cases. Rather than directly deny the
validity of sic utere tuo abenum non loedas-that there can only be
crimes when things are done which are dangerous or destructive
to others-courts found justification in the safety danger presented
by helmetless motorcyclists. 6 For, they reasoned, if a motorcyclist
was hurt for lack of a helmet, he might careen about creating a
danger to others.8 7 They thereby avoided the issue of the constitu-
tionality of legislating to protect individuals from themselves, al-
though one court intimated that because injured people were a
burden on the state, the state could exercise its police power broadly
to enact such legislation.""
To this argument, the Michigan Court of Appeals, after quoting
John Stuart Mill, posed the classic answer. The aim of preventing
motorcyclists from going out of control co-uld be served by narrower
legislation which did not infringe individual choice.8 9 Rejecting "pa-
ternalism," the court reasoned that legislation concerning safety de-
vices, such as motorcycle windshields, would be better adapted to the
purpose of preventing injured motorcyclists from endangering others 90
84 53 Misc. 2d at 590, 279 N.Y.S2d at 277.
85 People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Monroe County
Ct. Spec. Sess., 1967).86 Commonwealth v. Howie, 238 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1968); People v. Newhouse,
55 Misc. 2d 1064, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968) (rejection of vagueness
argument); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Buffalo City Ct.
1967) (discussion of police power); People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.
2d 290 (Erie County Ct. 1967); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625 (RI.
1968).
87 Id.
8 8 People v. Newhouse, 55 Misc. 2d 1064, 1065-66, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713, 714 (Ithaca
City Ct 1968).
9 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 1968). For
cases in which this rationale was used see Covington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965);
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(Query, however, the effect of aesthetic objections by owners to
such designs.) If, on that narrow ground of reasonable regulation
to effectuate the purpose of safety, the Michigan court appears the
most persuasive, it is clear that the principle of constitutional freedom
from "paternalism" is not universally accepted and must be argued
for, at least in that context. The dialogue though indicates a judicial
and judicious hesitation with respect to laws which preclude people
from taking personal risks. Such an approach reflects the constitu-
tional considerations previously suggested and traditional "liberal"
doctrines on the police power 1
Recently an alternate analysis, based upon complementary consti-
tutional doctrines, was advanced by Professor Bork. 2 He suggested
taking Justice Goldberg's concern in Griswold v. Connecticut93 with
the ninth amendment more seriously, reasoning that the first eight
amendments could be conceived of as specific examples of the gen-
eral set of natural rights protected by those eight and the ninth, and
one might argue, the tenth. Dealing mainly with the issue of legal
activism, Bork suggested that the Supreme Court should extrapo-
late on a case by case basis from the first eight amendments to give
cognitive content to the concept of rights in the ninth. Unfortunately,
he offers no principles, so it is hard to see how such an approach
would not be an excuse for judicial legislation. On the other hand,
one could argue that the ninth and tenth amendments reflect a doc-
trine of natural rights, if not natural law, so to invade a person's
identity-manifesting and identity-constituting activities, is a suspect
invasion of this realm. Bork aptly suggests that the selected inva-
sion must be the least destructive means available: "[A]II human
behavior should be entitled to the same level of constitutional con-
sideration . .. that is currently afforded non-political speech ....
The new concept of rights becomes, indeed, something roughly de-
scribable as a presumption in favor of human autonomy. '0 4  One
01 Recently, the United States Supreme Court dodged this issue and entered
into a confused debate on public drunkenness and criminal responsibility. Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). There is neither a majority opinion in Powell nor
much inspirational reasoning. Since a condition of public drunkenness, as in this
case, could be "dangerous," it arguably falls out of the class of action or expres-
sion without tangible harmful aspects. However, because by definition public
drunkenness is a crime without an act, there is an implied undermining of the
rationale of restraining only dangerous acts. Until the issue is directly confronted,
Powell should be considered in tandem with Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962), and, although troublesome, not dispositive.
921Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosoplhy, Foauru, Dec. 1968, at 138.
93381 U.S. 438 (1965).
941Bork, supra note 92 at 174.
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might say, that recognizing the complexity of activity and motive,
constitutional protections are relevant not only to discreet activities
but also to those who engage in them.
In this regard, it should be noted that courts have increasingly
emphasized the right to be the way you are regardless of how re-
pugnant it may be to others. In striking down the New York vagrancy
law, the New York Court of Appeals recently stated:
[A] statute whose effect is to curtail the liberty of individuals to live
their lives as they would and whose justification is claimed to lie in ...
police power... must bear a reasonable relationship to . . . the alleged
public good.... It is also obvious that today the ... only crime [of
vagrants], if any, is against themselves, and whose main offense usually
consists in leaving the environs of skid row and disturbing by their
presence the sensibilities of residents of nicer parts of the community.. .r
Reminiscent of the language in Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ.,9 the Court concluded that the unconstitutionality consisted
of an "overreaching of the proper limitations of police power in that
it unreasonably makes criminal . . . conduct of an individual which
in no way impinges on the rights or interests of others .... ,"97 Also
recalled is Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
The makers of our constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness .. . They conferred as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.98
The "right to be let alone," a recognition of the inviolability of a
person's identity and purely personal evidencing of it, is often char-
acterized and recognized as "privacy" and harks back to the original
attempt to create a society in which men were free to "pursue happi-
ness," to conduct their lives as seen fit, and to experience pain, plea-
sure and individual fulfillment. An underlying impulse and factor in
the formulation of "liberty," its most recent expression by the Su-
preme Court was in Griswold v. Connecticut,99 where the Court
refused to let a state proscribe means of contraception and procrea-
tion. This decision in turn echoed older pronouncements about "the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties.110D
The "right to be let alone" logically entitles citizens to engage in
behavior which the majority might consider distasteful or even com-
95 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 314, 229 N.E2d 426, 429-30, 282 N.Y.S.2d
739, 743-44 (1967). But cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See also Ricks
v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
96 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
97 20 N.Y.2d at 312, 229 NE.2d at 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
98277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
99 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
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pletely immoral, such as nudism or vagrancy. In analogous areas,
this conduct is often potentially harmful to the person himself; yet
to interfere with this constituting of his identity is to "unreasonably
interfere with the right of the citizen to determine for himself such
personal matters."11
Private personal indulgence in conscious-altering substances for rea-
sons of personal preference concerning the constitution of identity
and consciousness is an act whose essential and overriding purpose
and effect is not only that of inducing a personal private experience,
but also that of defining himself in part by the act. Whether the act
is motivated by or described as related to a desire for religious ex-
perience or metaphysical insight or merely a wish to "get high,"
it is not and does not affect others or limit the freedom of others to
live their lives as they see fit, except as a result of the way in which
people's identities affect others. A man who swears constantly
may offend some, an addict others. Both may bore even their
friends, but they are not affecting another's freedom by acts or poli-
cies, but only by the identical insistence on their own mode of life.
Friends or enemies may ignore them. It would appear, therefore,
that the use of such drugs falls within the class of constitutionally
protected private identity-constituting and identity-reflecting conduct
which is placed beyond the reach of the state's police power by the
Constitution and its underlying principles.
This argument must be placed at least congruently to the context
of political expression. It pays nodding acknowledgement to the idea
of unconscious intention and the relation and interpenetration of psy-
chology and politics. It suggests freedom to create and affect identity
and reactions may be a necessary condition for future political specu-
lation, formulation and action. On the other hand, it recognizes that
appearances and expressions reflect reactions and positions about
society that may have political implications. In short, there exists
a joinder of rationales-the hesitation to extend police power beyond
acts harmful to others, engendered by the common-law fear of power;
an interpretation of the Constitution which suggests that there are no
criminals, only crimes defined in terms of liberty-deprivation; and a
constitutional command of free speech whose effect is to protect its
origins and, wherever, possible impure expressions. These rationales
suggest a principle of law, often not strictly followed, that the ra-
tionale of state sanctioning under the Constitution prevents sanction-
ing for those self-directed acts which reflect ideas and express, affect
and constitute personal identity.
101 Hershberg v. City of Barbourville, 1,42 Ky. 60, 61, 133 S.W. 986, 987 (1911). See
cases cited in note 106 infra; Cortland v. Larson, 273 IMI 602, 113 NE. 51 (1916).
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Cases both ancient and recent suggest that courts do recognize and
apply the rationale developed above in analogous areas. There exist
only three possible reasons for not applying such reasoning in the area
of drug use: (1) use creates crime; (2) use leads to insanity, causing
parents to not support their children, who then become burdens on
the state; (3) use is tantamount to suicide. Noting that there is
considerable factual dispute about the accuracy of these contentions,
we will assume them true to discuss their relevance.
An old distinction exists, often ignored, particularly in the early
1950's, between words used in furtherance of a crime, perhaps in its
commencement, and words or ideas which are considered dangerous
to government and community. Those ideas which may lead to action
(e.g.; Das Kapital and Mein Kampf) are protected; those words in-
volved in the action (e.g., "you get the rope to hang him") do not
protect the actor.0 2 The rationale behind this distinction would seem
to rest on a belief in individual responsibility and free will. Ultimately
a man's act is his choice and his responsibility. Those things which
may encourage crime do not necessarily produce it. A man regardless
of temptation is guilty if he breaks the law.10 3 Crimes are acts and so
punished. Even to maintain that alcohol and drugs encourage or
motivate to crime does not argue for proscription-we maximize free-
dom to receive all influences on the faith that a man chooses and is
responsible and we can punish accordingly. In particular, the re-
quirement of nens rea suggests it is the decision to do the act that
predicates guilt, so that we look to an act of will, as it were. Since an
act of will is necessary, temptation, influence and inclination are
factors for the will, not direct causes. To punish factors is to change
the concept of guilt. Having a law of crime, not criminals, and ac-
knowledging the tremendous range of factors that may lead to the
commission of crimes, leads to the conclusion that even if drug use
102 Cases like Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) are direct authority, if of dubious
vitality, counter to the proposition. While this distinction is a theoretical one sup-
ported by some authority, requiring full argumentation perhaps beyond the scope
of this article, it is, according to the authors, the only constitutionally valid one
and of sufficient force to employ here. Certainly tests such as "clear and present
danger" are not relevant. Since the suggested distinction is not ideologically di-
rected toward violence or incitement thereto, its authoritative base and clear rele-
vance justify using it as established law here.
103 Only at the extreme limits of self-defense do we let duress or temptation
excuse a crime. See Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 624 (1884);
Clancy & Weiss, supra note 27 at 148-49; cf Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466
(1896).
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is associated with substantially higher crime commission, it may not
be proscribed on those grounds. T0
But saying this does not mean that some controls may not be
exercised. Courts have repeatedly held that dispensation of drugs
and liquors may be done only pursuant to a license and/or a pre-
scription.105 There is no reason why this principle could not be
employed to regulate sale of the drugs in question. Our argument
goes to use and possession. Distributing drugs to others could be
proscribed; it is not beyond the laws to issue rules abQut the circula-
tion of dangerous instrumentalities 08 The law can reasonably prohibit
minors from using drugs, liquor and tobacco 07 by controlling distribu-
tion, while refraining from broad proscriptions against possession and
use by the adult populace. That and that alone is protected as not
being an act which directly and nonideologically affects the lives and
actions of others.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to propose a regulatory
scheme, it may not be entirely inappropriate to suggest the outlines
of one. The unauthorized giving or selling of certain drugs could be
made illegal. The state could dispense drugs or have authorized
sellers, similar to state liquor store arrangements. In this way, price
and quality could be regulated. Inflated prices in the illicit drug
market would be decreased, making such activities less lucrative and
diminishing the likelihood that potential buyers would be compelled
to commit crimes to secure the purchase price. Negative propaganda
campaigns akin to those presently being conducted against cigarette
smoking, could also accompany drug legalization. Other crimes, such
104 To deny this we would have to reverse all criminal law. If junkies necessarily
commit crimes, then they lack a mens rea. If they act without a specific guilty
choice they have no requisite guilty mind. A whole line of cases has grown up in
this area. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Hansford v. United States,
365 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1966); People v. O'Neil, 66 Wash. 2d 263, 401 P.2d 928
(1965); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See generally Goldstein & Katz,
Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 YAIX L.J. 853 (1963).
10o Findings establish that marijuana does not cause crime. See Hearings on
Taxation of Marijuana H.R. 6385 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., (1937); Bromberg & Rodgers, Marijuana and Aggressive
Crime, 102 Am. J. Or PsYCEaARY 825-26 (1946). See generally Murphy, The
Canabis Habit, a Review of Recent Psychiatric Literature, 15 BULL. OF NARconcs,
No. 1 at 15, 19 (1963). On the other hand, the growth of riots following integra-
tion and demonstrations are grist for the mill of the racist right.
106 See Gray v. Conecticut, 159 U.S. 74 (1895); Rosenblatt v. California State 3d.
of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 158 P.2dc 199 (1945); cf. American Civil Liberties
Union v. Board of Educ. of City of Los Angeles, 59 Cal. 2d 203, 379 P.2d 4, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 700 (1963); American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Educ. of San Diego
Unified School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 224, 379 P.2d 16, 28 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1963).
107 Cf. Prince v. Massachusets, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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as providing drugs to a minor and aiding a minor in their use could
be created. Once dispensation is restricted to authorized sources,
regulation, except as to quantity which is an individual choice, may
be engrafted as it is for alcohol and off-track betting. In such a
system, sanctions are applicable and only private individual use or
communal use by adults would be permitted, and only if the drugs
were obtained from legal sources.
Many also maintain that use of drugs, particularly LSD and DMT,
has serious psychological consequences. But the problem is very
difficult. In many cases the state-labeled "insanity" is labeled by
others the ideal experience or style of life-"nervous." Claims that
drug use results in bizarre behavior and unproductive people are met
by claims that such behavior is ideal and that productivity is a false
value. Insanity itself raises many of the issues in the range of
freedom of expression. 08 Whether drugs create or manifest psycho-
logical patterns is in dispute;10 9 many materials legally obtainable may
contribute to a breakdown in mental functioning or lead to temptations
to obtain money illegally. Against this range of considerations we
may return to our previous distinction between tendency-creating acts
and expressions and the act itself. The use of materials which may
create a state of being characterized by some as insanity cannot be
prohibited, although illegal acts committed by the user, such as child
neglect,1 0 may be punished. The only difficult issue is the moral
question of these persons becoming a burden on the state and our
right therefore to prevent those things that increase that possibility.
But this issue appears to have been laid to rest by decisions in the
welfare field. People are free to move and to be burdens on the
state,"' and procreate and be burdens with their children on the
108 The authors would like to thank H. Leroy Jackson, Jr., for this suggestion.
109 See text accompanying notes 52-68 supra; note 99 supra. Note the dicta in
Allgeyer v. Louisiana that police power must respect and not infringe the right to
pursue happiness and use one's faculties in a lawful way. 165 U.S. 578, 589-90
(1897).
1o What of the argument, if sound, that use of LSD results in chromosome dam-
age? Even Thomas Acquinas thought a child not a murderable human until eight
days after conception, so it is hard to believe a conjectural statistical effect on a
non existent could be made the subject matter of a crime. We have come some
way since Holmes' third-generation-of-idiocy rationale. Compare Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Chromosomes are un-
likely victims for crimes; eugenics is not yet jurisprudence. Let us note in pass-
ing that cigarette smoking and hunger have been better demonstrated to injure the
unborn. Yet prosecutions of the welfare mother for failure to purchase foods con-
stituting a balanced diet would violate the established money-payment princi-
ple which allows recipients to spend as wanted.
1 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270
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state.1 2 2 If the consequence of a protected act means direct state
support, that is the unpredictable price a free society has to pay.'13
Many maintain, although many dispute, that drug use creates a
propensity to commit crimes."14  Assuming that were the case it
would make no argument. Could one prosecute for poverty? Could
one prosecute for belonging to a reading society whose traditions were
violence? or for having a cook-out where members were "likely" to
commit crimes?"51
Again, we must recur to the implicit model of man in criminal law.
We punish for acts made after decision. Many factors, rational and
psychologcial, may enter a decision and culminate in an act. We may
not punish on the basis of factors, although there may be some statisti-
cal correlation between factors and acts, since the function of punish-
ment is directed toward the individual, and must attend to his
individual acts, and the utilization, manifestation and control of the
various factors ingredient in a decision. A sum of factors is neither
a decision or an act-it requires the man to do something. Moreover,
factors interrelate and to prosecute for one factor without knowing
what others may be necessary to trigger the result would violate even
the rationale of prevention. Recognizing the complexity of decision
even without the common-law assumption of free will leads to a
rejection of decision-factor prohibition. And, let us note, that the acts
worried about are crimes subject to prosecution (and to prosecute
for drugs might lead to more irrationality in plea-bargaining) so one
could increase sanctions for crimes committed while under the influ-
ence of drugs as is done for liquor and gun use." 6
F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). But see Harrell v. Board of Comm'rs, 269 F. Supp.
921 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
122 Such would be the implication of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), particularly in conjunction with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Since travel and procreation are constitutionally protected rights, exclusion from
benefits because of the exercise of those rights would be an unconstitutional classi-
fication.
123 We encourage the payment of direct and indirect support for those things
enabling choice in the area of constitutional freedom. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Weiss, supra note 19 at 612-17, 621-23. Armies are raised
and supported so that people may live freely. The consequent loss of income and
burden on the state are the price of supporting freedoms of choice.
114 See TAYLOR, NAncoTics, NATe'S DAwGEsous GIFT 19 (1949). Consider the
reverse argument that crime and happiness are inversely related to heroin use.
'I See United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
116 Rather than violating the second amendment, proponents of gun control leg-
islation would be better-advised to follow the English method of imposing more
severe sanctions for crimes committed with guns.
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One might argue for possible prosecution for attempted suicide of
those who employ drugs. The analogy fails. In Russian roulette we
have a clear individual probability, in drug use statistical. For some
individuals, drugs might never decrease life expectancy for others
certainly; it may depend on the body type. Until we know the precise
mechanism for accurate prediction, we have no proof that a drug user
is risking his life and arguably attempting suicide. To the degree that
drugs are classified with those items which may tend to diminish life,
the distinction between tendency-creating acts and direct acts of
destruction still holds.
To approve of proscriptions against suicide is not inconsistent with
our thesis. Suicide is a form of murder. Not only an avoidance rather
than a solution of life's problems, it also can be considered immoral
because it, like all human deaths, wreaks irrevocable havoc on others
and destroys unduplicable potentialities. Unlike other acts which
manifest or create a propensity toward acts which are destructive,
suicide is irreversible and destroys the agency while creating harm.
Taking the steps one at a time: (1) Suicide is an act after which there
is no more. If a person does something which creates a tendency,
the tendency may be resisted or even the tendency-creating acts
ceased. An act of suicide is ultimate-nothing can reverse it or stop
its consequences. (2) The argument against prohibition of tendency-
creating acts rests on the idea that we punish on a model of free-will.
Sanctioning after mens rea does not apply to suicide for, after its
completion, there can be no free-will. The agency is no more. Suicide
prevents resisting the tendency. (3) Suicide has consequences on
others. On all these grounds, our argument does not prevent sanction-
ing suicide. If not, then the argument can be extended without ruining
the rationale on policy reasons.
IV. Co cusION
There is no impediment to our conclusion. Use of drugs reveals
certain perspectives and psychological patterns. When observed, it
may communicate sentiments as it arouses reactions. In a society
formed of equally free men with no restrictions on the pure communi-
cation of positions, with sanctions predicated on acts creating tangible
harm to others, drug use is outside the range of sanctions and pro-
tected as private expression. Assuming we only punish for acts
chosen by free men, those activities, including drug use, which a man
does to live with himself and articulate for himself his style of life
may not be forbidden.
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